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Abstract
In this note, we argue that in Common Agency games the restriction todeterministic menus is
critical. We give an simple example, with complete information and no moral hazard,where
an equilibrium is not robust to the introduction of stochastic menus.
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In games where principals compete in mechanisms, the Revelation Principle does not
hold: In general, attention to standard direct mechanisms is not without loss of gener-
ality. However, a Delegation Principle is valid. Roughly, the later says that all equilib-
rium outcomes of any common agency game where many principals can offer arbitrarily
complex mechanisms to a single agent, can also be implemented as an equilibrium out-
comes of a game where principals are restricted to offer sets (menus) of lotteries over
payoff-relevant allocations. (See Peters (2001) and Martimort & Stole (2002)).
The standard literature on Common Agency games usually assumes that lotteries
are not available. This assumption drastically simpliﬁes the analysis, but it carries some
unpleasant implications, which have not been fully investigated yet. For example, Mar-
timort and Stole write:
The main restriction in our analysis over general communication mecha-
nism games, therefore, is to limit the principals to offering menus with only
deterministicoutcomes(i.e., nonlinearprice-quantityschedules)ratherthan
allowing for more general menus of distributions (i.e., nonlinear price-
quantity lottery schedules). We are not aware of any equilibrium generated
by lotteries that is not also generated by nonlinear prices, but at present we
cannot state that this restriction is without loss of generality.1
The point of this paper is to give simple example with complete information and no
moral hazard showing that in a game where players have non-linear preferences some
equilibria are not robust to the introduction of lotteries.
Lotteries convexify the strategy set, and the convex hull is typically bigger than the
set itself. When facing a strategy proﬁle from other players, any player with non-linear
preferences will typically have a different best-response with a larger strategy set. This
idea applies to any game with many principals and many agents.2
2 The Model
We consider a scenario where there are a number of principals (indexed by i ∈ N =
{1,...,n}) contracting with one agent (denoted by index, 0). The agent’s type is drawn
from a set Q having a probability distribution F(.) that is common knowledge. We
assume that the agent takes an effort e from the set E. The principal i takes an action as
1Martimort & Stole (2003a, p. 20, footnote 17)
2See Attar et al. (2005) for a discussion on the role of deterministic mechanisms and the Revelation
Principle in multiprincipal multiagent models.
1well: He has to decide which allocation yi ∈Yi should be implemented. A principal is
able to contract on a probability distribution over Yi. In the following, DYi denotes the
set of all probability distributions over Yi.3
Thepayofftoprincipali∈{1,...N}isrepresentedbythevonNeumann-Morgenstern
utility function Vi : Õk∈NYk ×E ×Q → R+, while the agent’s payoff is given by the
functionU : Õk∈NYk×E ×Q → R+.
The principals compete through mechanisms. Each principals’ mechanism is a cou-
ple (Mi,si) where Mi is the chosen message space and si is a map from Mi to DYi. The
set of all feasible message spaces will be given by Mi and we also denote M =×i∈NMi
and M = ×i∈NMi. For the sake of expositional clarity, we assume that ∀i ∈ N, Q ∈ Mi
and ∀i ∈ N, ∀Ti ⊂ DYi, Ti ∈ Mi. These assumptions do not alter the qualitative insights
of the analysis, as long as the sets Mi are rich enough.
Finally, we will use the compact notation pi =(Mi,si). The principal i’s strategy set
will be given by PD
i , and PD denotes the collection of all those sets.
Each agent chooses a message mi ∈ Mi for each principal and an effort e. For every
collection of mechanisms (s,M) ∈ PD, a pure strategy for the agent is given by the map
s0 : Q×SD(M) → M×E; we will use S0 to denote the agent’s strategy set. Given the














We focus on the pure strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) of the game GD
M.
Peters (2001) and Martimort & Stole (2002) show that even if the Revelation Prin-
ciple fails to hold with respect to the game GD
M, the so-called Delegation Principle can
be applied in a general way. That is:
• One can restrict the set of relevant message spaces and consider the sets of all
subsets of DYi rather than Mi.
• It can be assumed that the map si is the identity over the chosen subset of DYi.











3In this model, playing a lottery is a pure strategy for a principal, this point has already been clariﬁed
by Peters (2001).
2where 2DYi denotes the set of all possible subsets of DYi.
Roughlyspeaking, theDelegationPrinciplestatesthatonecanconsiderthegameGDY
rather than the game GM, which simpliﬁes the analysis.
3 Deterministic Menus
If lotteries are not allowed, then a menu for principal i is given subset Ti of the decision
space Yi. We argue that there is no direct relationship between the set of equilibria of
a menu-game where lotteries are allowed, and that of the same game when stochastic
menus are considered. We clarify this point in the following example.
There are two principals (denoted 1 and 2). The two decision spaces are both given
by the set [0,1]. We allow principals to offer menus, that is, subsets of [0,1]. There is
one agent, who chooses his preferred outcome in each list, say y1 from principal 1 and
y2 from principal 2. Then, he communicates the choice to every principal, he says y1 to
principal 1 and y2 to principal 2. In a ﬁnal step, the actions y1 and y2 are implemented.
In this example there is no moral hazard problem, since E = / 0 and we also assume that
the agent has no private information.
The preferences of principal 1 over actions are deﬁned as given by:
V1(y1,y2) = y1(1−4y2). (1)








The agent’s preferences are given by
U (y1,y2) = −(y1−y2)
2. (3)
We claim that the following strategies form an equilibrium:
• Principal 1 offers the menu {1/8}.
• Principal 2 offers the menu [0,1]
• The agent chooses y2 = 1/8
3In this situation, U = 0, V2 = 10 and V1 = 1/16. Observe that Principal 1 offers a
so-called degenerate menu, i.e. his menu is made of one allocation only.
We now argue that this strategy proﬁle constitute an equilibrium. First, consider prin-
cipal 1: he has no reason to deviate to another degenerate menu {y1} . If he does that,
then the agent has an incentive to choose the item y2 = y1 in the principal 2’s menu. As
a consequence, the utility of the principal 1 becomes:
V1(y1,y1) = y1(1−4y1).
that is maximized for y1 = 1/8. Since principal 1 has no incentive to deviate to a de-
generate menu, he will also not have any incentive to deviate to a more complex menu.
Principal 1 has a proﬁtable deviation if lotteries are allowed. Suppose he plays
the following lottery: 2/17 with probability 1/3 and 3/17 with probability 2/3, he can
improve his payoff. In this case, the agent has to choose his preferred value of y2 in
the menu offered by the second principal which maximizes his expected utility. Simple

















is attained when y2 = 8
51 and thus the agent will choose y2 = 8
51 in principal 2’s menu.





















which is strictly greater than 1
16.
4 Discussion
One should observe that at equilibrium menus are convex sets, and all players have
standard utility functions. That is, the role of lotteries cannot be explained by existence
of some trivial non-convexities in the game.
Let us foccus on the relationship between the agent and the ﬁrst principal. They are
Nash players and they take principal 2’s strategy as given. Even if there is no moral haz-
ard issue in our game, the agent takes a non-contractible action: he chooses the decision
y2 in the menu offered by the second principal. Thus, principal 1 is in fact acting as if
he were in a moral hazard framework. He chooses y1 and the agent chooses y2.
4In is well known in moral hazard framework settings, lotteries may increase the pay-
off of the principal. Prescott (1999) gives two conditions under which a principal may
have an incentive to offers lotteries instead of deterministic allocations. First, if utilities
functions are not concave4, then the principal is likely to use stochastic mechanisms: if
the agent is risk-seeker, there is an potential gain by using lotteries. But Prescott (1999)
also indicates that non-separability between y1 and y2 in the agent’s preferences makes
stochastic mechanism desirable, even if the agent is risk-averse .5 Our example is re-
lated to other results such as Cole (1989), and thus it could be interpreted in a similar
way.
We also notice that lotteries play a critical role in contract theory. In multi-agent
games Strausz (2003) has recently shown that the Revelation Principle does not hold
for deterministic mechanisms, and direct mechanisms may be suboptimal. Lotteries
are relevant in general equilibrium settings: Prescott & Townsend (1984) have shown
that lotteries may help to convexify principals’ program and are necessary to show the
existence of an equilibrium when asymmetric information is explicitly introduced. Not
surprisingly, lotteries also play an important role in common agency games.
Lotteries are sometimes considered as unrealistic. Prescott (1999) provides some
arguments against that view. If lotteries are not explicitly found in the terms of con-
tracts, they can be indirectly implemented. Examples of such complex indirect stochas-
tic mechanisms are given by Cole & Prescott (1997) and Lehnert (1998).
5 Conclusion
The Delegation Principle is often invoked in applied papers to justify attention to menus.
For sake of simplicity and because of their economic appeal, authors limit attention to
pure strategy equilibria where competition is restricted to be in deterministic menus.6
However, the equilibrium outcomes of Common Agency games where competition
is arbitrarily restricted to deterministic menus may be not robust to the introduction of
stochastic mechanisms.
4With linear preferences, the solution is typically a corner solution and lotteries play no role.
5If agent’s preferences are separable in y1 and y2, if the utility function U (y1,y2) can be written as
˜ U (F(y1),f(y2)), then Attar et al. (2005) have shown that the Revelation Principal generically applies
and that the restriction to direct mechanisms is without loss of generality.
6Examples are given by Biais et al. (2000), Martimort & Stole (2003a), Martimort & Stole (2003b),
Calzolari (2004) or Bisin & Guaitoli (2004).
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